However, through careful analysis, we find that Mun et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks and insider attacks, and cannot provide user friendliness, user's anonymity, proper mutual authentication and local verification. To remedy these weaknesses, in this paper we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is more suitable for the low-power and resource-limited mobile devices, and is secure against various attacks and has many excellent features.
§1 Introduction
GLOBAL mobility network (GLOMONET) [1] provides global roaming service that permits mobile user to use the services provided by his/her home agent (HA) in a foreign agent (F A). When a mobile user roams into a foreign network, mutual authentication must first be solved to prevent illegal use from accessing services and to ensure that mobile users are connected to a trusted networks. A strong user authentication scheme in GLOMONET should satisfy the following requirements: (1) user anonymity; (2) low communication cost and computation complexity; (3) single registration; (4) update session key periodically; (5) user friendly; (6) no password/verifier table; (7) update password securely and freely; (8) prevention of fraud; (9) prevention of replay attack; (10) security; and (11) providing the authentication scheme when a user is located in the home network. More details about these requirements can be found in [2] .
In order to achieve secure and effective mutual authentication and privacy protection in GLOM-ONET, many authentication protocols have been proposed [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . In 2004, Zhu and Ma [3] proposed an authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless environments. However, Lee et al. [4] pointed out that Zhu et al.'s scheme [3] cannot achieve mutual authentication and perfect backward secrecy, and is vulnerable to the forgery attack. At the same time, Lee et al. proposed an enhanced anonymous authentication scheme, but Chang et al. [5] and Wu et al. [6] found that Lee et al.'s scheme also cannot achieve user'anonymity, and an attacker who has registered as a user of an HA can obtain the identity of other users as long as they registered at the same HA. After that, in 2011, Li et al. [2] found Wu et al. [6] is unlikely to provide user's anonymity due to an inherent design weakness and also vulnerable to replay and impersonation attacks. Then they constructed a strong user authentication scheme with smart cards for wireless communications. However, Li and Lee [7] showed that Li et al.'s scheme [2] lacks of user friendliness, and cannot provide user's anonymity and unfairness in key agreement.
Recently, Mun et al. [8] reanalyzed Wu et al.' authentication scheme [6] , they point out that Wu et al.'s scheme also fails to achieve user's anonymity and perfect forward secrecy, and discloses of legitimate user's password. Then they proposed an enhanced anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. However, through careful analysis, we find that Mun et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks and insider attacks, and cannot provide user friendliness, user's anonymity, proper mutual authentication and local verification. To remedy these weaknesses, in this paper we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is more suitable for the low-power and resource-limited mobile devices, and is secure against various attacks and has many excellent features.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic knowledge. In Section 3, we review Mun et al. ' s scheme and Section 4 shows the security weaknesses of Mun et al.'s scheme. A novel user authentication scheme is proposed in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme. Next, we compare the functionality and performance of our proposed scheme and make comparisons with other related schemes in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8 we make some conclusions. §2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the elliptic curve cryptosystem and some related mathematical assumptions. Compared with other public key cryptography, elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) has significant advantages like smaller key sizes, faster computation. It has been widely used in several cryptographic schemes of wireless network environment to provide desired level of security and computational efficiency.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem
Let E p (a, b) be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime field E p , defined by the non-singular elliptic curve equation: y 2 mod p = (x 3 + ax + b)modp with a, b ∈ F p and (4a 3 + 27b 2 )modp = 0. Identity of an entity X h(·)
A one-way hash function N X Number used only once (Random number) generated by an entity X Concatenation operation ⊕ XOR operation f K MAC generation function by using the key K K XY Session key between entity X and Y
The additive elliptic curve group defined as
where the point O is known as "point at infinity". The scalar multiplication on the cyclic group G p defined as k · P = P + P + · · · + P k times
. A point P has order n if n · P = O for smallest integer n > 0. More details about elliptic curve group properties can be found in [18] [19] [20] .
Related mathematical assumptions
To prove the security of our proposed protocol, we present some important computational problems over the elliptic curve group which are frequently used to design secure cryptographic schemes.
(1) Computational discrete logarithm (CDL) problem: Given R = x · P , where P, R ∈ G p . It is easy to calculate R given x and P , but it is hard to determine x given P and R.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given P, xP, yP ∈ G p , it is hard to compute xyP ∈ G p .
(3) Elliptic curve factorization (ECF) problem: Given two points P and R = x · P + y · P for x, y ∈ Z * q , it is hard to find x · P and y · P . §3 Review of Mun et al.'s scheme
In this section, we briefly review the Mun et al.'s scheme [8] . There are three phases in their scheme: registration phase, authentication and establishment of session key phase, and update session key phase. Three entities are involved: M U is a mobile user, F A is the agent of the foreign network, and HA is the home agent of the mobile user M U . Table 1 lists some notations used in Mun et al.s scheme.
Registration phase
When a mobile user M U wants to become a legal client to access the services, M U needs to register himself/herself to his/her home agent HA. The handshake between M U and HA is depicted in Fig. 1 .
MU (Mobile user)
HA (Home Agent) Step R1: M U sends his/her identity ID MU and a random number N MU to HA.
Step R2: HA generates a random number N HA and computes P W MU = h(N MU N HA ) and r MU = h(ID MU P W MU ) ⊕ ID HA .
Step R3: HA sends r MU , P W MU , N HA , ID HA , and h(·) to M U through a secure channel.
Authentication and establishment of session key phase
When a mobile user M U roams into a foreign network F A and wants to access services provided by F A. The F A needs to verify the validity of M U with the assistance of HA, and proves to M U that he is a legitimate service provider. The authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.'s scheme is shown in Fig.2 .
Step A1: M U submits ID HA , N HA and r MU to F A.
Step A2: F A stores the received message from M U for further communications and generates a random number N F A . Then, F A sends ID F A , N F A and r MU to HA.
Step A3: After receiving the message sent from F A, HA computes r ′ MU = h(ID MU P W MU ) ⊕ID HA and compares it with the received r MU . If they are not equal, HA considers M U as illegal user and terminates this procedure. Otherwise, HA can authenticate M U . Next, HA computes P HA = h(P W MU N F A ) and S HA = h(ID F A N F A ) ⊕ r MU ⊕ P HA . Then, HA sends the computed S HA and P HA to F A.
Step A4: When receiving S HA and P HA sent from HA, F A computes S random number a, and computes aP on E by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [].
After that, F A sends S F A , aP and
Step A5:
If they are not equal, the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, M U can authenticate F A and HA. Afterwards, M U selects a random number b, and computes bP and a session key K MF = h(abP ). Moreover, M U computes S MF = f KMF (N F A bP ), and sends bP and S MF to F A.
Step A6: After receiving the message sent from M U , F A computes K MF = h(abP ) and S ′ MF = f KMF (N F A bP ). FA verifies whether S ′ MF equals the received S MF . If the result is not correct, session key K MF = h(abP ) between M U and F A is not valid and F A terminates the procedure. Otherwise, F A can authenticate M U .
Update session key phase
M U and F A need to renew session key for security reasons if user is always within a same F A. When M U visits F A at the ith session, the following process is conducted to authenticate F A:
Step U1: M U selects a new random number b i , computes b i P (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and sends b i P to FA.
Step U2: F A selects a new random number a i and computes a i P (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Then F A generates a new session key K MFi = h(a i b i P ), and then computes
After that, F A sends a i P and S MFi to M U .
Step U3: M U computes session key
Procedure of update session key phase is depicted in Fig.3 .
MU (Mobile user)
FA (Foreign Agent) Since ID HA and r MU are the real home agent and correct personal information of M U respectively, the login request message can pass the validation of HA. Furthermore, HA will notify the F A ′ that the attacker who is masquerading as the user M U is a legitimate user. Therefore, the attacker can further establish a session key with F A ′ and access the services provided by F A ′ .
F A impersonation attacks
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.'s scheme, it can be found that the HA only authenticates the M U by verifying the received r MU but do not make any authentication to the F A. At the same time, there is no secret information of F A in the message
Thus an attacker can masquerade as a foreign agent F A to cheating any user M U ′ and M U ′ 's HA. For example, if the attacker intercepts a login request message {ID HA , N HA , r MU ′ } sent from M U ′ to F A, the attacker can generate a random number N F A and send {ID F A , N F A , r MU ′ } to HA by masquerading as F A. Since r MU ′ is the correct personal information of M U ′ and there is no identity authentication process of HA to F A. Therefore, the message {ID HA , N HA , r MU ′ } can pass the authentication of HA. At the same time, since the authentication of M U ′ to F A is completely dependent on HA and F A has been authenticated by HA, the F A will pass the authentication of M U ′ . Therefore, the attacker who is masquerading as the F A can establish a session key with M U ′ and tricks M U ′ successfully.
HA impersonation attacks
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.'s scheme, the F A authenticates M U and HA by verifying whether S ′ HA = S HA . However, there is a security vulnerability in this step such that an attacker can masquerade as a home agent to help any agent pass the authentication of a F A and access the services provided by F A. It is assumed that B is a agent who wants to access the services provided by F A and A is an attacker who masquerades as B's home agent HA to help B pass the authentication of F A.
First, B freely chooses two numbers N ′ and r ′ , and submits {ID HA , N ′ , r ′ } to F A. Then F A generates a random number N F A and sends the message {ID F A , N F A , r ′ } to HA. Right now, A intercepts this message, freely chooses a number P ′ , and computes
Then, A sends the computed S HA and P ′ to F A. When receiving S HA and P ′ sent from A who is masquerading as the HA, F A computes S
, selects random number a, and computes aP . After that, F A sends {S F A , aP, P F A = (S HA ID F A N F A )} to B. At this point, B does not need to verify the S F A , but directly chooses a random number b and computes K MF = h(abP ) and S MF = f KMF (N F A bP ). Then B sends bP and S MF to F A. After receiving {bP, S MF } sent from B, F A computes K MF = h(abP ) and S
By the above method, with the assistance of A, B establishes the session key K MF = h(abP ) with F A and can access the services provided by F A.
Off-line password guessing attacks
Most passwords have such low entropy that it is vulnerable to password guessing attacks, where an attacker intercepts useful information from the open channel or the lost smart card. In Mun et al.'s scheme, an attacker is assumed to have intercepted a previous full transmitted mes-
HA is equal to S HA , the attacker can regard the guessing password P W ′ MU as the original password P W MU . Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme cannot withstand the off-line password guessing attacks.
Insider attacks
In the registration phase, M U sends ID MU and a random number N MU to HA. Then HA generates a random number N HA , computes P W MU = h(N MU N HA ) and r MU = h(ID MU P W MU )⊕ ID HA , and sends {r MU , P W MU , N HA , ID HA , h(·)} to M U through a secure channel. It is obvious that the HA knows all the secret information of M U so that HA can impersonate M U to do anything. Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the insider attack.
Lack of user friendliness
User friendliness means that the proposed authentication scheme should be easily used by users. However, in the registration phase of Mun et al.'s scheme, the home agent HA sends the information {r MU , P W MU , N HA , ID HA , h(·)} to the user M U without using smart card. So that M U needs to remember and enter so much information in the authentication and establishment of session key phase. Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme is actually infeasible and unrealistic.
Lack of user's anonymity
In the second phase of Mun et al.'s scheme, M U sends r MU to F A instead of his/her real identity ID MU . Thus the authors claimed that their scheme achieves the user's anonymity. However, in each login message {ID HA , N HA , r MU } of M U , the contents of N HA and r MU are always unchanged. Any attacker could easily trace M U according to N HA and r MU and thus the user's anonymity cannot achieved.
Lack of proper mutual authentication
In Mun et al.'s scheme, the HA does not maintain any verification table. Thus after receiving the message {ID F A , N F A , r MU } sent from F A, HA cannot recognize which user launched the authentication request to F A. So HA cannot computes r ′ MU and checks it with the received r MU . On the other hand, even if HA can compute r ′ MU and check whether r ′ MU = r MU , it only means HA authenticates the legality of M U . However, it is found that HA do not make any authentication to the F A. Therefore, Mun et al.'s scheme cannot provide proper mutual authentication.
Lack of local verification
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.'s scheme, the M U directly enters and sends the login message to F A. Note that the smart terminal of M U does not verify the entered information correctly or not. Therefore, even if the M U enters the login message incorrectly by mistake or an attacker sends an forged message, the authentication phase still continue in their scheme. This obviously results to cause unnecessarily having extra communication and computational costs. §5 The proposed scheme
In this section, we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks using elliptic curve cryptosystem to not only protect the scheme from security breaches, but also emphasize the efficient features. In addition to including the general registration phase, authentication and establishment of session key phase and update session key phase, our scheme also contains the update password phase and authentication and establishment of session key scheme when a mobile user is located in his/her home network. Table 2 lists some notations used in Mun et al.s scheme.
Registration phase
When a mobile user M U wants to become a legal client to access the services, M U needs to register himself/herself to his/her home agent HA.
Step R1: M U freely chooses his/her identity ID MU and password P W MU , and generates a random number x MU . Then M U submits ID MU and h(P W MU x MU ) to HA for registration via a secure channel.
Step R2: When receiving the message ID MU and h(P W MU x MU ), HA computes Q = h(ID MU y) ⊕ h(P W MU x MU ) and H = h(ID MU h(P W MU x MU )). Then HA stores the Identity of an entity X h(·)
A one-way hash function Cert X Certificate of an entity X P X Public key of X S X Private key of X
Symmetric encryption/decryption using key K E K {·}/D K {·} Asymmetric encryption/decryption using key K Concatenation operation ⊕ XOR operation message {Q, H, C, ID HA } in a smart card and submits the smart card to M U through a secure channel.
Step R3: After receiving the smart card, M U enters x MU into the smart card. Finally, M U 's smart card contains parameters {Q, H, C, ID HA , x MU }.
The details of user registration phase are shown in Fig.4 .
MU (Mobile user)
HA (Home Agent)
Compute: 
Authentication and establishment of session key phase
When a mobile user M U roams into a foreign network F A and wants to access services provided by F A. The F A needs to verify the validity of M U with the assistance of HA, and proves to M U that he is a legitimate service provider. The authentication and establishment of session key phase of our proposed scheme is described as follows:
Step A1: M U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity ID MU and password P W MU . Then the smart card computes H * = h(ID MU h(P W MU x MU )), and checks whether H * = H. If they are equal, it means M U is a legitimate user. Otherwise the smart card aborts the session. Next, the smart card generates a random numbers a, and computes A = aP , R AC = aC, N = Q⊕h(P W MU x MU ), DID MU = ID MU ⊕h(R AC ) and V 1 = h(N R AC ID HA ). Then the smart card sends the request message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA } to F A over a public channel.
Step A2: After receiving the message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA }, F A generates a random numbers b, and computes B = bP , R BC = bC,
Here, S F A is the private key of F A, and Cert F A is F A's certificate. Then F A sends {B, W 2 , V 2 } to HA.
Step A3: When receiving {B, W 2 , V 2 }, HA first computes R BC = cB and decrypts D RBC [W 2 ] to reveal A, Cert F A , V 1 and DID MU . Then, HA verifies the certificate Cert F A and the F A's public key P F A . If they are valid, HA verifies the F A's signature V 2 by using the F A's public key P Step A4: F A decrypts D RBC [W 3 ] to reveal ID F A , Cert HA , A, B and W 1 . Then, the F A verifies the HA's signature V 3 by using the HA's public key P HA . If it is valid, HA is authenticated which also means that HA claimed M U is a legitimate user. After that, F A computes the common session key SK = h(bA) and sends {B, ID F A , W 1 } to M U .
Step A5: After receiving the message {B, ID F A , W 1 }, M U computes W * 1 = h(N A B ID F A ID HA ) and checks whether W * 1 = W 1 . If they are equal, F A and HA are all authenticated by M U . Then M U establishes the common session key SK = h(aB).
The authentication and establishment of session key phase is depicted in Fig.5 .
Update session key phase
Step U1: M U selects a new random number a i , computes A i = a i P (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and sends A i to FA.
Step U2: F A selects a new random number b i and computes B i = b i P (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Then F A generates a new session key SK i = h(b i A i ), and then computes S i = h(b i A i SK i−1 ). After that, F A sends B i and S i to M U .
Step U3: M U computes S 
Update password phase
This phase is invoked whenever M U wants to change his password P W MU to a new password P W new MU . There is no need for a secure channel for password change, and it can be finished without communicating with his/her HA.
Step U1: M U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity ID MU and password P W MU . Then the smart card computes H * = h(ID MU h(P W MU x MU )), and checks whether H * = H. If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the password change request. Otherwise, M U inputs a new password P W new MU and a new random number x new MU .
Step U2: The smart card computes Generate a random number , Compute: Step A1: M U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity ID MU and password P W MU . Then the smart card computes H * = h(ID MU h(P W MU x MU )), and checks whether H * = H. If they are equal, it means M U is a legitimate user. Otherwise the smart card aborts the session. Next, the smart card generates a random numbers a, and computes A = aP , R AC = aC, N = Q⊕h(P W MU x MU ), DID MU = ID MU ⊕h(R AC ) and V 1 = h(N R AC ID HA ). Then the smart card sends the request message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA } to HA over a public channel.
Step A2: After receiving the message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA }, HA first computes R AC = cA and ID MU = DID MU ⊕ h(R AC ) and V * 1 = h(h(ID MU y) R AC ID HA ). Then HA checks whether V * 1 = V 1 . If they are equal, M U is authenticated by HA. Next, HA generates a random number u, and computes U = uP and W 1 = h(h(ID MU y) A C U ID HA ). At last, HA computes the session key SK = h(uA) and sends {U, W 1 , ID HA } to M U .
Step A3: When receiving the message {U, W 1 , ID HA }, M U computes W * 1 = h(N A C U ID HA ) and checks whether W * 1 = W 1 . If they are equal, HA is authenticated by M U . Then M U establishes the common session key SK = h(aU ). §6 Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme can withstand all possible security attacks and can work correctly. Proposition 1. The proposed scheme can provide user's anonymity.
Proof. In our proposed scheme, the mobile user M U sends the login request message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA } to F A, where DID MU = ID MU ⊕ h(aC) is used to protect the real identity ID MU of M U . Based on the CDL problem, any attacker cannot obtain the random number a form A and thus cannot retrieve ID MU from DID MU . At the same time, the attacker cannot trace the moving history and current location of M U according to the login request message since A, DID MU and V 1 are dynamically changed in different login request messages of M U . Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide user's anonymity.
Proposition 2. The proposed scheme can provide proper mutual authentication and thus prevent impersonation attack.
Proof. In order to impersonation attack, the mobile user M U , the foreign agent F A, and the home agent HA should authenticate each other, which requires that our protocol provides mutual authentication mechanism between any two of them. The proposed scheme can efficiently prevent impersonation attacks by considering the following scenarios:
(1) The proposed scheme provides authentication of F A and HA to M U , and thus attacker cannot impersonate M U to cheat F A and HA. In the proposed scheme, whether MU is located in a foreign network or in his/her home network, the HA authenticates M U by verifying the computed V * 1 = h(h(ID MU y) R AC ID HA ) with the received V 1 = h(N R AC ID HA ). Since the attacker does not possess M U 's password P W MU , he/she cannot compute the correct N = Q ⊕ h(P W MU x MU ) and thus cannot cheat HA by forging a login request message. At the same time, since a is a one-time random number and only possessed by M U , V 1 is dynamically changed in each login request message. Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat the HA by replaying a previous login request message. Beside, when MU is located in a foreign network, the authentication of F A to M U is completely dependent on the authentication of HA to M U . If an attacker cannot successfully cheat HA by masquerading as M U , he/she cannot cheat F A successfully.
(2) The proposed scheme provides authentication of HA and M U to F A, and thus attacker cannot impersonate F A to cheat HA and M U . In the proposed scheme, the HA authenticates F A by checking whether D PF A {V 2 } equals h(A, V 1 , DID MU ), where V 2 is F A's digital signature. Obviously, the attacker cannot compute the correct F A's digital signature without knowing F A's private key S F A . Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat HA successfully by masquerading as F A. At the same time, the authentication of M U to F A is completely dependent on the authentication of HA to F A. If an attacker cannot successfully cheat HA by masquerading as F A, he/she cannot cheat M U successfully.
(3) The proposed scheme provides authentication of F A and M U to HA, and thus attacker cannot impersonate HA to cheat F A and M U . In the proposed scheme, the F A authenticates HA by checking whether D PHA {V 3 } equals h(Cert HA , W 1 ), where V 3 is HA's digital signature. Obviously, the attacker cannot compute the correct HA's digital signature without knowing HA's private key S HA . Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat F A successfully by masquerading as HA. Besides, the M U authenticates HA by verifying the computed W * 1 = h(N A B ID F A ID HA ) with the received W 1 = h(h(ID MU y) A B ID F A ID HA ). Since any attacker cannot compute the correct W 1 without knowing ID MU and y, the attacker cannot cheat M U successfully.
Proposition 3. The proposed scheme can withstand the replay attack.
Proof. An attacker might replay an old login request message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA } to F A and receive the message {B, ID F A , W 1 } from F A. However, the attacker still cannot compute the correct session key SK = h(aB) since he/she cannot derive the secret information a form A = aP based on the security of CDL problem. Thus, the proposed scheme can prevent the replay attack.
Proposition 4. The proposed scheme meets the security requirement for perfect forward secrecy.
Proof. Perfect forward secrecy means that even if an attacker compromises all the passwords of the entities of the system, he/her still cannot compromise the session key. In the proposed scheme, the session key SK = h(abP ) is generated by two one-time random numbers a and b in each session. These two one-time random numbers are only held by the M U and F A respectively, and cannot be retrieved from A = aP , B = bP , R AC = aC = cA and R BC = bC = cB based on the security of CDL and CDH problem. Thus, even if an adversary obtains all the passwords of the entities, previous session keys and all the transmitted messages, he/her still cannot compromise other session key. Hence, the proposed scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy.
Proposition 5. Our scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack with smart card security breach.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, it is assume that if a smart card is stolen, physical protection methods cannot prevent malicious attackers to get the stored secure elements. At the same time, attacker can access to a big dictionary of words that likely includes user's password and intercept the communications between the user and server.
It is assumed that an attacker has obtained the information {Q, H, C, ID HA , x MU } from the stolen M U 's smart card and has intercepted a previous full transmitted messages {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA , B, W 2 , V 2 , W 3 , V 3 , B, ID F A , W 1 }. In the proposed scheme, M U 's password only makes two appearances as H = h(ID MU h(P W MU x MU )) and V 1 = h((Q ⊕ h(P W MU x MU )) aC ID HA ). Obviously, the attacker cannot launch an off-line password guessing attack with-out knowing the ID MU and a. Since it has been demonstrated that our scheme can provide user anonymity and a is M U 's secret random number, the proposed scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack with smart card security breach.
Proposition 6. The proposed scheme can withstand insider attack.
Proof. If an insider of the home agent HA has obtained a user M U 's password P W MU , he/she can impersonate as M U to access any foreign agent. In the registration phase of the proposed scheme, M U sends identity ID MU and h(P W MU x MU ) to HA. Thus, the insider cannot derive P W MU without x MU . Besides, in the password change phase, M U can change his/her default password P W MU without the assistance of his/her HA. Therefore the insider has no chance to obtain M U 's password, our scheme can withstand the insider attack.
Proposition 7.
There is no verification table in the proposed scheme.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, it is obvious that the user, the foreign agent and the home agent do not maintain any verification table.
Proposition 8. The proposed scheme can provide local password verification.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, smart card checks the validity of M U 's identity ID MU and password P W MU before logging into F A. Since the attacker cannot compute the correct H without the knowledge of ID MU and P W MU to pass the verification equation H * = H, thus our scheme can avoid the unauthorized accessing by the local password verification. §7 Performance comparison and functionality analysis
In this section, we compares the performance and functionality of our proposed scheme with some previously schemes. It is well-known that most of the mobile devices have limited energy resources and computing capability. Hence, one of the most important issues in wireless networks is power consumption caused by communication and computation. In fact, the communication cost in the GLOMONET is higher than computation cost in terms of power consumption. In table 3, we list the numbers of the message exchanges in the login, authentication and session key establish phases of our scheme and some related previous schemes. And the bit-length of communication of the mobile client in these phases is also shown since the foreign agent and home agent are regarded as powerful devices. Table 4 shows the computational cost of our proposed scheme and some other related protocols. Here we mainly focus on the computational cost of the login, authentication and session key establish phases because these phases are the principal part of an authentication scheme. In general, our proposed scheme spends relatively few communication and computational cost. It is suitable for the low-power and resource-limited mobile devices. Table 5 lists the functionality comparisons among our proposed scheme and other related schemes. It is obviously that our scheme has many excellent features and is more secure than other related schemes. 
